There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce e¢ cient rules, but which of them produces rules e¢ ciently? Is there an optimal mix of litigation and legislation? The law is inevitably subject to a certain degree of uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials di¢ cult to predict and, hence, prevents parties from settling disputes out of court. Conversely, the law is necessarily certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation) and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such equilibrium rates of litigation and uncertainty in a formal model, study how they are a¤ected by two di¤erent policies -litigation fees/subsidies and legislation -and compare the costs and bene…ts of the legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking. We then extend the analysis to explore the implications of this approach.
Introduction
In The Betrothed, Alessandro Manzoni describes the tragic consequences of a disagreement about the right of way on the streets of 17 th -century Italy.
"They both walked next to the wall, which (be it observed) was on Ludovico's right hand; and this, according to custom, gave him the right [...] of not moving from the said wall to give place to any one, to which custom at that time, great importance was attached. The Signor, on the contrary, in virtue of another custom, held that this right ought to be conceded to him in consideration of his rank, and that it was Ludovico's part to give way. So that in this, as it happens in many other cases, two opposing customs clashed, the question of which was to have the preference remaining undecided, thus giving occasions of dispute, whenever one hard head chanced to come in contact with another of the same nature." 1 The dispute ends in tragedy: "There's one,-There are two.-They have pierced his body.-Who has been murdered? [...] Escape, poor fellow, escape". 2 Although not all con ‡icts are resolved in such bloodthirsty ways, disagreement about the dictates of the law imposes a heavy toll on society in terms of uncertainty of legal entitlements 3 and judicial costs incurred to 1 Manzoni (1840, Ch. 4, Par. 7). 2 Ibidem Par. 20. 3 Weber (1925) remarks that certainty of law and predictability of adjudication are necessary conditions for the achievement of economic goals. Posner (1973, p . 451) observes: "The costs to the legal system imposed by the uncertainty of decision according resolve it. 4 Somewhat later than the …ctional events reported in the novel, Blackstone's Commentaries of the Laws of England read:
"The uncertainty of legal proceedings is a notion so generally adopted, and has so long been the standing theme of wit and good humour, that he who should attempt to refute it would be looked upon as a man, who was either incapable of discernment himself, or else meant to impose upon others."
"[This uncertainty] must be imputed to the defects of human laws in general, and [is] not owing to any particular ill construction of the [legal] system." 5 Aristotle also refers to the impossibility of achieving certainty in the law as an inherent limitation of lawmaking. 6 Turning to modern legal systems, one could argue that the rules of interpretation that open most civil codes are a testimony to both the concern with certainty and the full awareness of its impossibility. 7 The same idea is embedded in the very process of "coralstyle creation" 8 of the common law by judicial lawmaking and pervades the spirit in which restatements and statutes are compiled in the United States and elsewhere.
We employ the notion of uncertainty of law to refer to the fact that it is di¢ cult to predict perfectly ex ante how the law will be applied ex post by the courts. 9 For instance, the law may be unclear concerning whether a to a standard may exceed the bene…ts of a formally more e¢ cient criterion of liability." From a di¤erent perspective, see Dixit (2004) discussing how various institutions support economic activities absent the law. 4 Tillinghast -Towers Perrin (2005, p. 5) …nds that the overall cost of the US tort system amounted to $245.7 billion in 2003, half of which is due to the administrative costs of the system. 5 Blackstone (1765-1769, Book III, Ch. 22). 6 Aristotle (350 BC, Sec. 1, Part 9)); see further section 2.2. Leoni (1991, Ch. 4) provides an interesting discussion about certainty of law starting from ancient Greece. See Hart (1994) and Solum (1999) on the theory of the indeterminacy of law. See Green (2005) , examing legal realism and Hart's (1994) critique to it in relation to indeterminacy of law and predictability of adjudication. 7 Grundfest and Pritchard (2002) contends that ambiguity in the law may be the result of an e¤ort by the legislature to compromise between di¤erent and often contrasting political views. 8 Llewellyn (1960, p. 120) , also emphasizing the role of the e¤ect of uncertainty on the rate of litigation, discussed below in the text. 9 Our notion of uncertainty is close to the notion of uncertainty used in economics as opposed to risk (Knight, 1921) . In sociology, legal certainty as discussed by Weber (1925) is intended as 'gaplessness' of the legal system, in which all decisions are applications of certain sanction follows from any given conduct, whether a tortfeasor is to pay damages to the victim of a certain accident, or which of two parties is vested with a property right. 10 There are several reasons why the law may be di¢ cult to predict. Unforeseen contingencies, the inherent ambiguity of language itself, the use of vague notions (such as bona …de, reasonable man, or bonus pater familias), and a natural process of obsolescence due to continual changes in society and technology may all contribute to this state of a¤airs. 11 Previous literature has examined this problem from three main the law, abstract laws are applied to concrete cases by the use of logic, and every conduct can be quali…ed either as compliance with or violation of the law. See also the analysis by Carbonnier (1988) . Perelman (1968) and Bobbio (1993) deny the existence of gaps in the law on the grounds that any ex ante gap will always be …lled ex post by the courts, which cannot deny justice. See also Kelsen (1960, pp. 245-250) . This claim does not a¤ect our reasoning, since we focus on the parties' inability to predict perfectly ex ante what the courts will decide ex post ; moreover, even if the law is clari…ed by a court with reference to a speci…c case and hence is ex post perfectly clear in such a case, some uncertainty may persist with respect to how other courts will decide analogous cases in the future. Llewellyn (1951, p. 14) observes: "rules [...] are important so far as they help you see or predict what judges will do." 1 0 Although criminal law tends to be less vulnerable to incompleteness thanks to principles of nullum crimen sine lege or nulla poena sine lege, problems may arise nevertheless. Pistor and Xu (2003, pp. 942-943) reports that theft of electricity created some uncertainty and hence litigation in more than one legal system in the late 19 th century, as it was not clear whether electricity quali…ed as an 'asset'as de…ned by the law of theft. 1 1 This can be simply due to time passing. However the process of obsolescence can be accelerated by high rates of activities in certain areas of the law over a certain period. Blackstone (1765-1769, Book III, Ch. 22) observes: "When the people of Rome were little better than sturdy shepherds or herdsmen, all their laws were contained in ten or twelve tables: but as luxury, politeness, and dominion increased, the civil law increased in the same proportion, and swelled to that amazing bulk which it now occupies". See also Kelsen (1960, pp. 348-356) and Hart (1994, pp. 124-136) . Landes and Posner (1976) considers that the body of precedents can be analogized to a capital stock that depreciates over time. Calabresi (1982, p. 2) refers to the obsolescence of law, analyzing the role of courts and legislatures in American law. Posner (2003, p. 503) observes that the common law that developed in relation to accidents involving carriages and horse-drawn wagons was not an adequate response to the legal problems arising from the use of modern means of transportation. Zweigert and Kötz (1998, pp. 90-91) make a similar point about the rapid obsolescence of articles 1382-1386 of the French Civil Code after the Industrial Revolution. One may object to this trend by observing that, although the rule becomes obsolete, the decision criteria that judges employ are so predictable that no uncertainty arises, as it is perfectly clear how they will interpret the law in future disputes. This point is well taken, but simply turns the problem of certainty in the law into one of certainty in the meta-law (the rule used to interpret and innovate existing laws). This argument may regress ad in…nitum, unless we can arrive -along Kelsen's (1960) lines -at a common (meta)rule, a Basic Norm, on which everyone agrees and from which all other rules can be unequivocally derived. The maximization of social welfare has been proposed as such a fundamental rule perspectives: rules vs. standards (when should the law be clari…ed?), 12 incomplete law theory (who should clarify the law?) 13 and complexity of law (who bene…ts from uncertainty?). 14 All of these approaches share the same aim of providing a theory capable of evaluating di¤erent lawmaking institutions on the basis of their ability to produce e¢ cient rules. The key contribution of this paper is instead to ask the question of whether these institutions produce rules e¢ ciently.
of policymaking by law and economics scholars, but it is fair to say that there is large disagreement not only on whether but also on how such criterion should be implemented (see Kaplow and Shavell, 2002 , and the literature thereby quoted) As long as this is not possible, our argument holds for meta-rules as it holds for rules. 1 2 The distinction between rules and standards (Ehrlich and Posner, 1974; Diver, 1983 ) depends upon the degree of precision with which the law is stated. Standards such as the reasonable man or the bonus pater familias are vague ex ante and their content is determined ex post by a judge on a case-by-case basis. Instead, rules such as a speed limit are precise ex ante. Kaplow (2000) argues that legal systems need to …nd an equilibrium between over-detailed rules and ambiguous standards, stressing pros and cons of either approach. This distinction does not directly bear on our framework. The process of legal clari…cation that we describe may concern both rules and standards. On the one hand, rules need adaptation when they become obsolete and lose adherence to reality: an obsolete rule may generate uncertainty. On the other hand, standards are more vague to begin with and need a constant work of judicial adaptation. However, standards need not be more unpredictable than rules, if the way in which courts interpret the standards is stable and clear. Likewise, the rules vs. standards dichotomy does not perfectly correspond to the distinction between complete and incomplete law, to which we refer in the next note and accompaning text. Pistor and Xu (2003, p. 941 ) distinguishes between type I and type II uncertainty. The former refers to standards, which are ex ante incomplete by de…nition. The latter refers to rules, which are ex post incomplete as it is inherently impossible to account for all possible contingencies. Along similar lines, Schauer (2003) argues that the distinction between rules and standard may disappear in practice, as decisionmakers push standards towards rules and vice versa. Also Ehrlich and Posner (1974, pp. 277-278 ) discusses the latter feature of rules and notices that rules age more quickly than standards, precisely because of their speci…city. A related contribution is Parisi, Fon and Ghei (forthcoming) discussing the timing of legal innovation through legislation. Scott and Triantis (forthcoming) examines the choice between rules and standards by contractual parties in anticipation of future litigation. 1 3 Pistor and Xu (2003); Xu and Pistor (2003) . The notion of incomplete law is the conceptual analog of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore, 1999) . The incomplete law theory focuses on the allocation of residual lawmaking and enforcement functions to courts and regulatory agencies under incomplete law. Tirole (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999) observe that for a contract to be incomplete parties must be unable to forcast their future payo¤s probabilistically; the logic of this point is analogous to our notion of uncertainty and will be central in the selection of cases for trial presented below in section 2.
1 4 White (1992) studies the problem of legal complexity from a public choice perspective arguing that lawyers bene…t from a certain degree of uncertainty. We return to the role of lawyers in the conclusions. Eggleston, Posner and Zeckhauser (2000) discuss complexity in contracts.
Conceptually, we make a distinction between the e¢ ciency of the products of the lawmaking process and the e¢ ciency of the legal process itself in providing a certain, complete and predictable set of rules at the lowest cost for society. In principle, certainty in the law may be attained irrespective of whether the content of legal rules is in accordance with notions of welfare, fairness or justice. 15 We examine two ways in which a legal system may address problems of uncertainty in the law; the two lawmaking institutions that we consider are litigation and legislation. 16 We suspect that enhancing the study of the legal process will also advance our understanding of the rules thereby produced and hence o¤er a more re…ned toolbox for the comparison of judge-made law vs. statutes. 17 1 5 We make therefore no claim concerning whether judges or legislators are more ef…cient rule-makers and whether ine¢ cient rules are litigated more often than e¢ cient ones. Landes and Posner (1976) analyze the production of legal rules but consider only the judiciary as a source of legal certainty. Our contribution is di¤erent because we also consider the legislature. In Landes and Posner's analysis, new legislation is a source of uncertainty rather than of certainty, we discuss this possibility further in the text. Priest (1987) considers the e¤ect of uncertainty on litigation rates; in addition to this aspect, we also examine the e¤ect of litigation on uncertainty. 1 6 Unlike previous literature, focusing in private interference with the lawmaking process, we abstract from private parties'e¤orts to change statutory or judge-made rules through lobbying or strategic litigation, respectively. We will discuss this issue along with other motives for litigation in section 6.5. See Rubin, Curran and Curran (2001), studying such a forum choice by rent-seeking parties. 1 7 The academic discussion on the relative merits of judge-made law vs. statutes mainly originated from the e¢ ciency-of-the-common-law hypothesis, stating that judge-made laws tend to be more e¢ cient than those enancted by legislatures, because (i) judges seek e¢ ciency (Posner, 2003, p. 503) or because (ii) ine¢ cient rules are more often (Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977) or (iii) more intensely (Goodman, 1978) challenged in court than e¢ cient ones. These studies are based on the demand-side pressure towards e¢ ciency provided by repeat litigants. Others have objected that ine¢ ciency may result from the indeterminacy of the evolutionary process (Cooter and Kornhauser, 1980) , the pressure of organized interest groups similar to regulatory capture (Hirshleifer, 1982; Rubin, 1982; Bailey and Rubin, 1994) , the want of relevant information (Aranson, 1992) , the fact that courts only hear a biased sample of cases (Had…eld, 1992) . For recent studies see Rubin (2005a and 2005b) , Gennaioli and Schleifer (2005) and Hylton (2005) . Supply-side analysis are provided by Zywicki (2003) , in which is the competition among di¤erent courts that drives the e¢ ciency of the common law, and Fon and Parisi (2003) , which introduces the idea that legal evolution may be explained by whether playnti¤s or defendants exert more control over the jurisdiction, having the choice of whether (and where) to …le a claim. From a broader perspective, the debate on the e¢ ciency of the common law is related to the still growing literature on legal evolution, law and …nance and legal origins, studying the di¤erences between legal systems with respect to their ability rapidly to adapt to changes in society (Hayek, 1960) , provide good institutions (North, 1988; Mahoney, 2001 ; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003), or well-functioning markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), and trying to explain the origin of Deriving our implications from a large and consistent body of previous literature, we provide a theoretical model of the legal process. We proceed by …rst focusing on the relationship between the degree of uncertainty in a certain area of the law and the rate of litigation in that area. The interplay of uncertainty and litigation is bilateral: more uncertainty yields more litigation; on the contrary, more litigation leads to less uncertainty. In fact, when matters are less clear and more di¢ cult to predict, parties'expectations over the outcome of the adjudication are more likely to diverge. As a result, parties to a dispute will tend to settle less often and the litigation rate will increase. Conversely, when more cases are adjudicated, courts have an opportunity to remove some of the ambiguities in the law and thus reduce the degree of uncertainty.
Society may incur relevant costs due to the uncertainty of legal entitlements and bear direct and indirect expenses associated with the litigation process. Seeking to reduce these costs, policymakers may alter the rate of litigation by taxing it, thus increasing the burden on the parties to a dispute and improving their incentives to settle. 18 Alternatively, the legislator may intervene to remove the doubts in the system by amending the law. In reality, uncertainty in the law may increase as a result of legislation as usually new statutes are followed by a cloud of contrasting interpretative attempts. For the purpose of this analysis, however, we can ideally decompose legislative e¤ort into two types: gap-…lling, aimed at enhancing the law's ex ante certainty, and reforms, aimed at changing the law. Throughout the analysis, we will refer to gap-…lling legislation and only consider law reforms along with other causes of uncertainty.
Given the mutuality between the degree of uncertainty and the rate of litigation, the e¤ects of such policies are far from straightforward. Trying to reduce the litigation rate (by increasing the litigation costs) will also resuch di¤erences (Glaeser and Schleifer, 2002) . See also the reports of the World Bank's (2003, 2004 and 2005 ) Doing Business Project. For a critique of the common law system of lawmaking see Tullock (1997) . Roe (1996) explains legal evolution as a combination of a weakly-dominant natural selection of su¢ ciently e¢ cient rules, accidental events and path dependence. From a public choice perspective, the problem has been analyzed by Crew and Twight (1990) . On the point of e¢ ciency of legal rules, see also Stinchcombe (1999) for a comparison of Weber's (1925) support for a rigid civilian approach to lawmaking and legal certainty and Llewellyn's (1960) praise of the piecemeal approach of the common law. Recent literature also compares rules produced by means of legislation with rules produced through adjudication on the basis of their cognitive characteristics (Schauer, 2005; Rachlinski, 2006) . 1 8 Law and economics scholars have observed that the private incentives to resort to litigation may not be aligned with society's interest. See Priest (1982) and Shavell (1982b and sult in an increase in uncertainty, due to fewer cases going to trial, which in turn makes the litigation rate increase, having an o¤setting e¤ect on the direct aim of the policy adopted. Likewise, clearing up legal uncertainty by amending existing laws will reduce uncertainty and, hence, improve parties' propensity to settle; but, when litigation decreases, the degree of uncertainty rises, countervailing the initial reduction. 19 Only by considering the interaction between uncertainty and litigation can we assess the …nal e¤ects of litigation-costs policies and direct legislation and discuss their impact on social welfare.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we set the framework of the analysis; building on a large body of existing literature we illustrate the microfoundations of our theory. In section 3, we present a model for the macro-analysis of the legal process. In section 4, we discuss two policy instruments, direct legislation and litigation fees/subsidies, and describe their e¤ect on the rate of litigation and the degree of uncertainty. In section 5, we discuss the e¤ects of litigation and legislation on social welfare. In section 6, we conclude with some comments on additional issues that may bear on our analysis.
Framework
Our analysis focuses on the decision of risk-neutral individuals whether to settle or go to trial as a function of how clear and predictable the law and its application by the judiciary are. Four main hypotheses govern this framework:
1. Litigation results in the creation of precedents which help clarify uncertain laws; settlement does not produce precedents;
2. Uncertainty in the law supports litigation because it makes parties more likely to have di¤erent expectations concerning the outcome of the adjudication and thus less likely to settle out of court;
3. Litigation costs borne by the parties in a controversy a¤ect their propensity to go to trial instead of settling out of court: higher costs reduce the rate of litigation, while lower costs foster litigation;
4. The legislature may vary the amount of resources invested in reducing the degree of uncertainty while promulgating new laws, amending or abrogating existing ones.
All of these issues have been individually investigated in both legal and economic scholarship. In this section, we will better explain their implications for our model and discuss their support in existing literature. Readers who are familiar with the literature can skip this section without loss of continuity. In the next section, we will present a formal model of uncertainty of law and litigation.
More litigation, less uncertainty
Like Kuhn's (1962) alternation of scienti…c theories, the law needs to be continually adapted to the modern means of production of goods and ideas, exchange and interaction. Absent a refreshing process of judicial adaptation (or, as we will examine in the following, legislative amendments), the more time passes, the more obsolete any rule is inexorably bound to become. By adjudicating cases and writing opinions, judges help to clarify the ambiguities in the law and …ne-tune abstract rules to an ever-changing array of concrete cases. They do so by creating new common law precedents or by interpreting statutes. 20 Litigation, however, is expensive for society.
The subtle arts of settlement and alternative methods of dispute resolution are often prized for allowing the legal system to save on litigation costs. Nevertheless, as Posner (1973, p. 442) observes, enhancing the settlement rate "cannot be regarded as unequivocally desirable" since it reduces the information-production e¤ect of litigation. Such information is in fact a positive externality of the litigation system because it also accrues to third parties not involved in the dispute and only potentially interested in the same problem in the future. 21 Settlement agreements are not generally dis-closed. Thus, they lack the ability "to explicate and give force to the values embodied [in the law, interpret them, and] bring reality into accord with them. [... As a result, settlement may] deprive a court of the occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation." 22 On the contrary, in the course of a trial, judges not only in common but also in civil law jurisdictions may help lift the veil of uncertainty surrounding unclear legal issues and contribute to the evolution of precedents or the formation of a jurisprudence constante. 23 
More uncertainty, more litigation
Aristotle (350 BC, Sec. 1, Part 9), discussing Solon's constitution, observes:
ince the laws were not drawn up in simple and explicit terms [...], disputes inevitably occurred, and the courts had to decide in every matter, whether public or private. Some persons in fact believe that Solon deliberately made the laws inde…nite, in order that the …nal decision might be in the hands of the people. This, however, is not probable, and the reason no doubt was that it is impossible to attain ideal perfection when framing a law in general terms."
There are two aspects of the e¤ect of uncertainty of law on the rate of litigation that need to be considered here. Firstly, uncertainty in the law may a¤ect the rate at which a con ‡ict between two parties arises; secondly, once a con ‡ict has arisen, uncertainty in the law may a¤ect the litigants'decision whether to go to trial or settle the dispute. Concerning the …rst aspect, as noted in the passage cited above, uncertainty in the law may increase the amount of compliance and enforcement errors and, more in general, the number of violations. For example, under very complex taxation rules, people may incur in some violations although they intended to abide by the law. More precisely, uncertainty in the law is analogous to assuming that there are type-I and type-II errors in the enforcement of the law. One who believes to act in his or her own right could be punished and one who intentionally violates the law could get away with it. Literature on the economics of law enforcement has long remarked that both occurrences induce an increase in the number of violations. 24 An enforcement error is not necessarily an error on the part of the enforcer, but may be also interpreted as an error in predicting what the enforcer will do. Thus, due to uncertainty, more con ‡icts are likely to arise, because the cost of violating (what one thinks is) the law is reduced by one type of error, while the other adds a potential cost to compliance, unbalancing the choice in favor of violation.
When this occurs, parties may still avoid a trial by settling the case as mentioned in the preceding second aspect. Trials are expensive and, at times, painful experiences both for society and for the parties involved. On this basis, it is easy to explain why the vast majority of cases are settled without even being …led, at some point before the trial 25 or, at latest, "on the courthouse steps". 26 Rather puzzling is instead why any case is tried at all. 27 Th economic models addressing this matter may be divided into two main groups. On the one hand, Landes (1971) , Posner (1972 Posner ( , 1973 , and Gould (1973) provide models of litigation in which parties have diverging expectations over the outcome of the adjudication. Both parties are optimistic about their chances to win and hence may not be inclined to settle for a lower amount. 28 This divergence has been explained in di¤erent ways. Kritzer (1991) , Ross (1980) , and Danzon and Lillard (1983) for …gures and studies on the US litigation system. 2 6 Spier (1992) explains that delay in settlement may be due to the parties trying to signal that they are tough in order to extract a better deal. 2 7 For recent surveys on the economics of litigation and settlement see Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Hay and Spier (1998), Daughety (2000) , and Daughety and Reinganum (2005a) . 2 8 Landes (1971) is the now standard model of litigation. See also Shavell (1982a), Danzon and Lillard (1983) and Priest and Klein (1984) . Gould (1973) also shows that if both parties are inclined to think that they will lose, it is advantageous for them to litigate and bet against themselves, thus exploiting their private information. Posner (1973, p. 418) regards this case as empirically irrelevant, because the betting contract will not be The parties may derive such optimistic beliefs from some private information they possess about the likelihood to win in court, 29 which they may not be willing to disclose to their counterparts or they are unable to credibly do so or they do not do so for fear of losing the advantage of surprise at trial. 30 A di¤erent reason why parties' expectations may diverge emerges from experimental evidence, pointing to the fact that disputants make selfserving valuations of their probability to win the case. There is a systematic tendency for one to believe to have better chances than his or her counterpart. 31 Uncertainty in the law makes the outcome of the adjudication more di¢ cult to predict and hence supports the divergence of the parties' subjective expectations. 32 On the other hand, others explain litigation by considering that parties have di¤erent stakes although they face the same probability of victory, 33 that parties may sue for merely strategic reasons in order to extract a settlement o¤er or other bene…ts 34 or for irrational motives, 35 that the rate of litigation may be a¤ected by the way lawyers are paid, 36 or that parties may settle in order to avoid the bad publicity of a trial or the formation legally enforceable and because each party will have an incentive to behave during the trial as to lose the case. See also Drahozal (2004) , analyzing ex ante selection of disputes to defer to arbitrators instead of judges. Lederman (1999) provides an empirical analysis of predictors of trial. 2 9 Bebchuk (1984) . See also Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Kritzer (1991) and Kennan and Wilson (1993) . Spier (1994) shows that a positive fraction of cases will not be settled even if negotiation consists of a long series of o¤ers and countero¤ers.
3 0 Posner (1973, p. 422). If this is not the case, parties will disclose their private information in the pretrial phase in order to obtain a more generous settlement agreement (Shavell, 1989) . The presence of discovery rules that oblige parties to lay down their private information before the trial may facilitate settlement (Sobel, 1989) but, even so, parties may still be uncertain about each other's investments in the trial, which a¤ect the probability of winning (Hay, 1995) . Pretrial negotiation may also break down because parties fail to agree on how to split the surplus accruing from settlement (Cooter, Marks and Mnookin, 1982) ; such failure can also be derived from asymmetric information on each other's barganing power (Farmer and Pecorino, 1994 Hanssen (1999) …nds that courts with appointed judges exibit higher litigation rates than courts with elected judges and argues that this di¤erence may be explained by the fact that appointed judges are more independent and hence less predictable than their elected colleagues. 3 3 See Rubin (1977) , Priest (1977) and Goodman (1978) . See also Posner (1973, p. 419 ) with a simple model of litigation due to higher stakes.
3 4 P'ng (1983); Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) ; Bebchuk (1988) ; Katz (1990) . 3 5 Cross (2000) . 3 6 See Anderson (1996).
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of precedent. 37 We do not deny the importance of such explanations. In fact, the relative importance of uncertainty vs. other causes of failure to settle is a determinant of the elasticity of the litigation rate to the degree of uncertainty, which in turn, as we will discuss in the following, determines the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on litigation and uncertainty of law. We will also return on this issue in the conclusions.
More gap-…lling legislation, less uncertainty
More e¤ort expended in lawmaking may slow down the natural process of obsolescence of the law. A caveat is needed here however. As we anticipated in the introduction, it may not seem obvious that legislation enhances certainty in the law; as a matter of fact it often does the opposite. 38 Pascal (1658, p. 40) observes: "les obscurités se multiplient par les commentaires" (the more commentaries, the more obscure the law is).
In order to avoid these complications, we restrict our analysis to a speci…c type of legislative e¤ort, that aimed at …lling gaps in the law. In other words, we consider that, given a speci…c law, the legislator could make it clearer by investing more resources in more careful drafting and testing. 39 This could also mean abrogating or simply rewriting a statute, without introducing any new disposition. Legislation that makes the law more unclear does not enter our analysis, because the lack of clarity is hopefully not the principal aim of the legislator, but an accident that could have been avoided by more careful and systematic drafting. The cost, however high, of such improvements is what we consider in the analysis under the label of legislation costs. This view is in line with Bentham's (1817) endorsement of codi…cation as a way to rationalize the law and reduce the uncertainty of the legal system. From this perspective, gap-…lling legislation may be seen as a public, centralized, and ex ante supply of legal certainty.
More litigation costs, less litigation
We have already remarked that, ceteris paribus, settlement is preferred over trial because of its lower costs for the parties. There is extensive literature on the fact that, if the litigation costs increase, the litigation rate drops, since litigation becomes more expensive relative to settlement. Likewise, if litigation costs decrease, the rate of litigation is expected to rise. 40 Litigation costs include any cost borne by the parties to a dispute, thus also lawyers'fees, time, distress, delay in judgment, 41 and possibly litigation fees. The policymaker can a¤ect these costs by altering the litigation fee or introducing a litigation subsidy (as for instance through legal aid). Contrary to legislation, a litigation-cost policy does not directly a¤ect the degree of uncertainty of a legal system, but, through the e¤ect on the rate of litigation, has an indirect e¤ect, which will be analyzed in the next section.
It is …nally important to remark that the litigation costs that are relevant at this point of the analysis are those borne by the parties. The portion of the cost of the judicial system borne by the taxpayers does not play a role as a determinant of litigation, but will enter our analysis at a later stage when we discuss social welfare.
Model
The reciprocal in ‡uence of uncertainty and litigation on each other can be illustrated by means of a simple model. Let L 2 [0; 1] denote the rate of litigated cases: L = 0 if all cases are settled, L = 1 if all cases are tried. In addition, let U 2 [0; 1] be some index of the degree of uncertainty of law over a certain legal issue, which can also be used as an index of how much the parties' expectations over the outcome of the adjudication are likely to diverge: U = 0 if parties' expectations over the probability of success converge, U = 1 if parties'expectations are diametrically divergent.
In our framework, the rate of litigation L depends on the degree of uncertainty U and on the privately-borne cost of litigation C 2 [0; 1); conversely, the degree of uncertainty U depends on the rate of litigation L and on the legislature's gap-…lling e¤ort S 2 [0; 1). According to the four statements supported in the previous section, these relations can be expressed as follows:
with:
1. u L 0: More litigation, less uncertainty. Litigation enables the judicial system to intervene in the process of clarifying the law in response to a changing social and economic environment, countering obsolescence, and it may be seen as a constant process of consolidating the law by means of reconciling it with constantly emerging new scenarios.
2. l U 0: More uncertainty, more litigation. Private parties' decisions of whether to settle or litigate are contingent on the degree of uncertainty over the legal matter of the claim. More uncertainty makes parties'expectations over the judicial adjudication more often diverge and therefore increases the litigation rate.
3. u S < 0: More gap-…lling legislation, less uncertainty. Public, direct supply of certainty through legislation …lls gaps in the law and counters the process of obsolescence leading to a reduction in the degree of uncertainty.
4. l C < 0: More litigation costs, less litigation. A higher private cost of lawsuits curbs litigation and enhances settlement.
While L and U are variables, C and S are policy parameters. Given any pair of C and S, there will be equilibrium rates of litigation and uncertainty that balance each other out as shown in …gure 1 (which, for simplicity, depicts straight lines).
FIGURE 1
Let upper bars denote the levels of L and U that solve expression (1). Such equilibrium levels of litigation and uncertainty may also be expressed as functions of C and S, as to emphasize that the equilibrium rates of litigation and uncertainty depend upon these two parameters: L = l (C; S) and U = u (C; S),
Comparative statics analysis
The policymaker can control both policy parameters: the investment in gap…lling legislation can be varied, and litigation can be taxed or subsidized as to a¤ect the cost privately borne by the parties. In order to appreciate the e¤ects of changes in the litigation costs on L and U , let us consider the total derivative of L with respect to C: 42
An increase in the litigation costs triggers a decrease in the equilibrium level of litigation. Since the partial derivatives l U and u L appear in the denominator, and their product is negative, it is clear that when their absolute values decrease, the e¤ect of litigation costs on the equilibrium level of litigation is enhanced. That is to say that the less interdependent litigation and uncertainty are, the more e¤ective a policy of controlling the rate of litigation through litigation costs is. Conversely, the more litigation and uncertainty mutually in ‡uence each other, the more the attempt to reduce the rate of litigation by means of an increase in litigation costs will be o¤set by the fact that when litigation decreases, uncertainty increases and tends to produce a counteracting force that induces an increase in litigation. As a result, litigation will decrease less than it would have in the absence of any feedback e¤ect. A litigation-cost policy to control the rate of litigation attains the maximum e¤ect when either l U or u L is zero (the litigation rate is independent of uncertainty and / or the degree of uncertainty is independent of litigation).
It is also easy to show that the …nal e¤ect of an increase in the litigation cost is an increase in the level of uncertainty; vice versa, the …nal e¤ect of a reduction in the litigation cost is a reduction in the level of uncertainty. In fact:
If u L = 0, a litigation-cost policy has no e¤ect on the level of uncertainty. However, if l U = 0, the e¤ect is larger than for positive levels of l U . In general, the e¤ect of litigation-cost policies on uncertainty is directly related to the absolute value of u L but inversely related to l U . The results so far attained can be summarized by the following proposition: Proposition 1. An increase in litigation costs reduces the level of litigation but increases the level of uncertainty; vice versa, a reduction in litigation costs increases the level of litigation but reduces the level of uncertainty. The less litigation a¤ ects uncertainty (i.e. the less ju L j), the greater the e¤ ect of litigation-cost policies on litigation and the less the e¤ ect thereof on uncertainty. On the contrary, the less uncertainty a¤ ects litigation (i.e. the less jl U j), the greater the e¤ ect of litigation-cost policies on both litigation and uncertainty.
Likewise, in order to assess the e¤ect of public supply of certainty let us calculate the total derivative of U with respect to S:
An increase in the public supply of certainty causes a reduction in the level of uncertainty for any given level of litigation. However, since uncertainty has decreased, the equilibrium level of litigation will also decrease, triggering as a result an increase in uncertainty. The attempt to reduce uncertainty by publicly supplying certainty may be partially o¤set by a reduction in the private supply of certainty through litigation. As before, the e¤ectiveness of supply policies depends negatively upon the degree to which litigation and uncertainty mutually a¤ect each other. The maximum e¤ect of supply policies may be attained when either u L or l U is zero. Conversely, a reduction in the public supply of certainty will increase litigation and therefore the …nal e¤ect on the actual level of uncertainty might be partially o¤set.
Finally, it is easy to show that the …nal e¤ect of an increase in the public supply of certainty is a reduction in the level of litigation and, vice versa, a reduction in the public supply of certainty causes an increase in the level of litigation. In fact:
If l U = 0, a supply policy has no e¤ect on the rate of litigation. However, if u L = 0 the e¤ect is higher than for negative levels of u L . In general, the magnitude of the e¤ect of supply policies on litigation is directly related to l U but inversely related to the absolute value of u L . These results can be synthesized by the following proposition: Proposition 2. An increase in the public supply of certainty reduces the rate of litigation while also reducing the level of uncertainty; vice versa, a reduction in the public supply of certainty increases the rate of litigation while also increasing the level of uncertainty. The less uncertainty a¤ ects litigation (i.e. the less jl U j), the greater the e¤ ect of supply policies on uncertainty and the less the e¤ ect thereof on litigation. On the contrary, the less litigation a¤ ects uncertainty (i.e. the less ju L j), the greater the e¤ ect of supply policies on both litigation and uncertainty.
Legislation vs. litigation-costs policies
The relationship between litigation and uncertainty may be loosely analogized to a demand-supply model for the speci…c good of our concern: certainty of law. This analogy is only suggestive and may help us interpret the results in a graphical manner, but it should not be understood as carrying the usual meaning in terms of prices and quantities exchanged in a market. The litigation function L = l(U; C) can be interpreted as the demand for certainty. In fact private parties are willing to litigate and bear the related costs in order to reduce the cloud of uncertainty that surrounds the legitimacy of their claims rather than settle in the shadow of such uncertainty. The curve L = l(U; C) provides a measure of how much parties are willing to pay in terms of litigation to enhance certainty (i.e. reducing uncertainty), for any given level of litigation costs C. Litigation is the 'price'that parties are willing to pay for certainty of law. Conversely, the uncertainty function U = u(L; S) may be seen as a private supply function of certainty. Through litigation parties reduce the degree of uncertainty. The curve provides a measure of how much litigation is needed in order to reduce uncertainty, for any given level of the public supply of certainty S. Litigation is the 'cost'of producing certainty through adjudication. An equilibrium is attained when our 'demand' and 'supply' cross each other, as depicted in …gure 1. Note that the …gure depicts uncertainty on the horizontal axis, while demand and supply refer to certainty. This is why the slopes are inverted if compared to traditional models, and why we observe a decreasing supply function and an increasing demand function.
The above discussion on the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on the levels of litigation and uncertainty may thus be reframed into a traditional framework in which the demand and supply curves are shifted up-or downwards by exogenous shocks either on the demand side (a variation in the litigation costs C) or on the supply side (a variation in legislation S). The results of propositions 1 and 2 will be hereafter reinterpreted with the help of simple graphical analysis.
The e¤ect of litigation costs on litigation and uncertainty
A variation in litigation costs C has the e¤ect of shifting the demand function L = l (U; C). If litigation costs increase, the demand function moves downwards as in …gure 2 (a). The …nal result of an increase in litigation costs is an increase in uncertainty and a partially o¤set decrease in litigation. This result quantitatively depends on the elasticity of the litigation and uncertainty functions.
FIGURE 2
If uncertainty U = u (L; S) is perfectly inelastic with respect to changes in litigation, an increase in litigation costs corresponds to a …nal decrease in litigation without increasing uncertainty, as depicted in …gure 2 (b). On the contrary, if uncertainty is perfectly elastic as in …gure 2 (c), an increase in litigation costs only corresponds to an increase in uncertainty, as the e¤ect on the rate of litigation is completely o¤set by the feedback e¤ect of uncertainty on litigation.
It may be further remarked that the elasticity of the litigation function L = l (U; C) with respect to changes in uncertainty of law a¤ects the e¤ec-tiveness of litigation cost policies, the e¤ect being maximal when litigation is inelastic.
The e¤ect of legislation on litigation and uncertainty
Public intervention in the legal system as a way to provide better and clearer rules has an obvious direct and negative e¤ect on the degree of uncertainty. However, since a reduction in uncertainty also reduces litigation, increasing public e¤ort in clarifying the law may be partially o¤set by a reduction in the private supply of certainty through litigation, as shown by …gure 3 (a).
FIGURE 3
An increase in the public supply of certainty S as a direct e¤ect reduces uncertainty. As an indirect e¤ect, a reduction in uncertainty also reduces litigation. The outcome of certainty-supply policies is a reduction in both litigation and uncertainty. As before, the outcome quantitatively depends on the elasticity of the curves. If litigation is perfectly inelastic, an increase in the supply of certainty reduces uncertainty without reducing litigation, as in …gure 3 (b). On the contrary, if litigation is perfectly elastic, public supply of certainty only reduces litigation, while the degree of uncertainty remains unchanged, as in …gure 3 (c). In the latter case, public supply of certainty simply substitutes the private one, without any resulting e¤ect on legal certainty. Also the elasticity of the uncertainty curve a¤ects the outcome. The e¤ect of supply policies is maximal when uncertainty is inelastic.
The socially optimal levels of litigation and uncertainty
In the previous sections, we remarked that equilibrium levels of litigation and uncertainty exist that mutually determine each other. The e¤ect of public policies aimed at controlling either or both depends on their reciprocal interaction and on the o¤setting e¤ects that we have emphasized. In this section, we address the question of what the optimal levels of litigation and uncertainty are, among all the equilibrium levels of litigation and uncertainty that may be attained by some combination of litigation-costs and legislation policies. In our simple framework, litigation does not directly a¤ect deterrence. 43 Rather, deterrence is a¤ected, as we have explained, by the level of uncertainty in the law, through the e¤ect that uncertainty has on the probability of type I and II errors in the legal system.
Let us consider as a benchmark case a world without uncertainty, in which the litigation rate is zero and the allocation of resources is optimal. We can then compare the real world to such an ideal one. Finding the socially optimal levels of uncertainty and litigation and, consequently, designing optimal policies to achieve them in a world with a positive degree of uncertainty in the law may be regarded as a cost minimization problem. In this scenario, litigation triggers some direct costs in terms of court administration, lawyers'fees and emotional distress, a portion of which, C, is directly borne by the parties, while the rest is borne by taxpayers. Uncertainty triggers instead allocative costs, as the lack of certainty concerning legal entitlements distorts the process of resource allocation. Moreover, the public supply of legal certainty has a cost that, without loss of generality, we will be represented by the level of public supply itself, S. Let G represent the overall cost of the judicial system due to litigation and D represent the allocative cost of uncertainty. 44 Let us further specify these costs as follows:
The litigation costs C borne by the parties to a dispute may represent a fraction of the overall costs, C G, or they may exceed the cost G. 45 In the latter case, a tax is levied on litigation. In either case, C represents a transfer between the litigants and the taxpayers and is therefore not included in the determination of the total social cost. On the contrary, the magnitude of the overall cost, G, matters. The social cost minimization problem may be formalized as follows:
For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that the problem in expression (2) is strictly convex and has positive and unique solutions. Let C and S denote such solutions. They satisfy the two …rst-order conditions:
From the assumptions made, it is easy to show that the signs of the terms in the former expressions are as follows: 46
These results show the trade-o¤ at work in the balancing of the di¤erent costs derived, on the one hand, from the functioning of the legal system and, on the other hand, from uncertainty in legal rules. The optimal settings of the two policy parameters than we consider ought to take such trade-o¤s into account. From expression (3) it follows that the private costs, C, a¤ects the cost of litigation and the costs of uncertainty in opposite ways; hence, the problem is to …nd a balance in the trade-o¤ between decreasing the overall litigation costs and increasing the misallocation costs for a given level of public supply of certainty. From expression (4) it follows that since S a¤ects G and D in the same direction, an increase in the public supply of certainty of law reduces both the overall cost of litigation and the misallocation costs. The optimal level of S balances a decrease in their sum with an increase in the direct cost of public supply of certainty of law.
Concluding remarks
While modern economic analyses focus primarily on the e¢ ciency of legal rules, the legal process itself was the target of scorn by some of the most pointed writers, from Aristophanes (The Wasps, 422 BC) to Kafka (The Trial, 1925) . On the relationship between legal rules and the legal process, Holmes (1881, p.1) observed that "In order to know what [the law] is, we must know what is has been, and what it tends to become. We must alternatively consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most di¢ cult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new products at every stage". We have attempted to describe the mutual interaction between the diachronic development of the law through the judicial process and the e¤ects of legislative intervention through the lens of an economic theory of the lawmaking process. Although the law necessarily su¤ers from some degree of ex ante uncertainty, gaps may be …lled ex post by the courts. This analysis has considered ex ante legislation and ex post adjudication as alternative ways to reduce the uncertainty of the law; we have argued that the rate of litigation in a legal system and its degree of uncertainty are connected with each other. By using a simple model we have regarded certainty of law as a good that can be supplied by the state or privately sought by the citizens through the judicial process of dispute resolution.
When detailed laws are directly supplied by the legislature, the degree of uncertainty falls; however, a fall in uncertainty causes a similar reduction in the level of litigation, which in turn increases uncertainty. Therefore, the net e¤ect of legislation on uncertainty is less than its direct e¤ect. Our analysis provides the insight that attempts to foster the certainty of the law may …nd a natural obstacle in the o¤setting e¤ect they have on the courts' lawmaking activity. The likely response to direct legal amendments by the legislature is a drop in both the degree of uncertainty and the litigation rate.
When the policymaker targets the litigation rate by a¤ecting the costs of bringing a lawsuit through taxes or subsidies, the litigation rate and the degree of uncertainty change in opposite directions. If the cost of litigation is lowered, the litigation rate will rise, causing the degree of uncertainty to fall, while the reduction in uncertainty partially o¤sets the rise in litigation. Instead, if the policymaker aims at reducing the litigation rate, uncertainty will rise and thus spur more litigation, partially o¤setting the intended direct e¤ects of the policy. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the rate of litigation and the degree of uncertainty of a legal system are inherently related and that one cannot control the former without a¤ecting the latter and vice versa. In carrying out our study of the legal process, we have abstracted from several aspects that may bear on legislation and adjudication. In the following, we will o¤er some comments on some additional factors.
Common vs. civil law
In the face of the divide between civil law and common law jurisdictions, our theory posits that broader reliance on judge-made law may yield systematically higher litigation rates, due to the fact that less certainty of law is provided by the legislatures. However, the legal process, both in courts and at the legislative level, is not only concerned with gap-…lling. Many if not most laws innovate on old ones, rather than clarifying their dictates. Law reforms may result in more rather than less uncertainty irrespective of whether they are carried on by legislatures or by courts, making it necessary to distinguish between gap-…lling and reforms.
Our approach emphasizes that neither the common nor the civil law system is in principle superior, the di¤erence between the two being a di¤erent balance in the allocation of costs triggered by the production of law. Legislation comes at a cost that is entirely paid by taxpayers, while the litigation costs are at least partially borne by the disputing parties. We have provided some indications of how the optimal mix of litigation and legislation could balance these costs.
Our theory raises another point that concerns the modern waves of litigation in certain areas of the law, such as medical malpractice or product liability. We have stressed that policies aimed at reducing the litigation rate also a¤ect the degree of the law's uncertainty and will, under certain conditions, su¤er from a serious feedback e¤ect due to the fact that reduced litigation triggers uncertainty, which in turn tends to raise the litigation rate. Understanding the way in which litigation and uncertainty in the law interact will help policymakers and scholars comprehend the e¤ects of policies targeting either problem.
An interpretation of our results -the one that more directly follows from our model -is that governments may curb the degree of uncertainty of the legal system by supplying certainty directly through legislation or indirectly through the judicial system, at the price of higher litigation rates. A second interpretation, which mirrors the …rst, is that governments may want to reduce the litigation rate and may do so directly, by burdening litigants with additional costs, thus increasing uncertainty, or indirectly, by providing certainty and hence removing the motives for litigation.
We have tried to assess the costs and bene…ts of the di¤erent ways in which such policies may be carried out. While the cost of centralized, direct lawmaking is borne by taxpayers, the cost of indirect lawmaking through the courts is partially borne by taxpayers and partially spread among litigants in the form of lawyers'fees and time spent dealing with the judicial system. Legislation thus has a direct and publicly borne cost, while private parties at least partially carry the costs of litigation, both in terms of time and money devoted to the case and in terms of the distortions that the uncertainty over their rights imposes upon their activities. Whether the ultimate aim is to reduce uncertainty or to keep litigation under control, the optimal mix of the two policies described above -legislation vs. litigation taxes or subsidies -has been shown to balance their public and private costs.
Our analysis of the legal process is static. Nevertheless, there are some dynamic aspects of the interaction between litigation and legislation that bear on the comparison between civil and common law. Leoni (1991) and Zywicki (1996 Zywicki ( , pp. 996-1004 observe that there is a relationship between the source of law (judicial precedent vs. legislation) and the nature of the uncertainty surrounding the dictates of the law. According to this view, the common law is more likely to exhibit short-term uncertainty. Given a process of regular judicial revision, the common law continually and incrementally changes but it does so within clear and stable principles that make it predictable in the long run. On the contrary, legislation is more precise and hence more predictable in the short run, but law reforms through legislation are di¢ cult to predict and are luckily to have an e¤ect on the long-term certainty of the system. Moreover, legislation tends to evolve with big, sudden changes rather than with incremental ones. This may bring a whole new set of problems to the courts, which cannot ground their decisions in preexisting judicial practices. Although there are relevant exceptions, this trend may make statutory innovations more uncertain in the long run than incremental common law evolution. Another aspect that may play an important role from a dynamic perspective is the issue of retroactivity. While judge-made law is not retroactive, legislation can in principle have retroactive e¤ect, even though not in all areas of the law. The possibility to reverse the law retroactively may also add to the long-term uncertainty of the system.
Substantive vs. procedural law
In the analysis, we have focused on substantive law. However, uncertainty in the law may derive from rules, institutions and practices governing the enforcement of the law rather than from the law itself. When this is the case, the process of legal clari…cation and the striving for certainty is more likely to concern procedural and public law than substantive law. In this scenario, improving accountability of local institutions, countering corruption and limiting discretion of public o¢ cials will be more e¤ective than amending the law. 47 
Law and customs
Besides the law, customs have an important role in shaping behavior. Likewise, they also a¤ect the way in which people perceive the law and, consequently, they have an impact on the uncertainty of law. As the quote that opens this article suggests, con ‡icting customs may result in disagreement and con ‡ict in a similar way as con ‡icting interpretations of the law result in litigation. Custom con ‡icting with written law may also increase uncertainty when it is not perfectly clear which one prevails. However, under some circumstances, contra legem customary rules may reduce uncertainty. As Ellickson (1991) observes, informal customary rules may be so rooted in a certain social environment that they prevail on the law. When this is the case, uncertainty of law may be an irrelevant problem, as people will not resort to judicial enforcement of their perceived rights. From a di¤erent perspectives, certain groups or individuals could rely on customs precisely because they consider them as more certain than the law. Although it is di¢ cult to say whether in principle customs should be regarded as more or less uncertain than the law, there may be a selection biases in favor of certainty. If certainty is taken into account as part of the value of a legal rule, certain customs are likely to survive, while uncertain customs are likely to disappear and be replaced by law. 48 
Advertising the law
Posner (1973, p. 430) observes that 'litigation is a more costly method of producing information than advertising,' leading to the point that the uncertainty in the law could be curbed by investing in di¤usion of existing information rather than producing the same information ex novo. Restatements may be seen as a form of advertising the law. In itself, a restatement is not a source of law but its role as guidance for future judgments is di¢ cult to deny. In addition, the legal system could rely on information produced during alternative methods of dispute resolution. Arbitrators in general do not write opinions and settlement terms are often kept private. Although other considerations may bear on the argument, lifting the veil of con…-dentiality that surrounds alternative dispute resolution may be bene…cial, thereby enhancing the production of information. Nevertheless, such information would have a real value only if arbitration or settlement outcomes in ‡uenced following decisions by courts or else provided valid elements for predicting them. It is not clear however that any of the latter could be the case.
Lawyers and law professors
Lawyers and academics are also an integral part of the legal process. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) has emphasized the virtues of advocacy in producing valuable information on the pros and cons of certain judicial or leg-islative decisions. In this view, advocacy is bene…cial for the legal system as a whole. From a di¤erent perspective, not only do lawyers assist parties in a trial but they also provide them with legal advice. Parties may bene…t from legal advice ex ante about contemplated acts (Shavell, 1988 , and Kaplow and Shavell, 1992) or ex post about acts already committed Shavell, 1989 and 1990 ). This literature concludes that legal advice may or may not be desirable for society depending on the context. The recourse to lawyers is likely to quantitatively alter the propensity of parties to settle. White (1992) shows that lawyers may have a direct interest in a certain level of complexity and uncertainty in the law, (because more uncertainty results in more litigation and hence larger pro…ts for lawyers) but not an excessive level, because complexity increases lawyers' fees and hence reduces the amount of litigation. 49 In our analysis, litigation costs are exogenously determined by the policymaker. However, it could be objected that, as the law becomes more uncertain, litigation costs may rise due to more time being devoted to each case by lawyers and judges. Endogenizing litigation costs would be an interesting extension of our analysis.
Unlike lawyers, academics produce commentaries and information about the law which, even if aimed at a speci…c case (ex ante through an amicus brief or ex post through a comment on a speci…c judicial decision), are written with the purpose of a¤ecting future scholarship, legal doctrines and possibly judicial lawmaking. Scholarly attention is more likely to be directed towards unsettled judicial practices and may hence a¤ect the process of legal clari…cation. The direction of this e¤ect, however, is not a priory obvious, as academics often disagree with each other on what the solution to a problem should be. Certainty in the law may also derive from the involvement of other institutions, such as enforcement agencies or private associations. The analysis could be extended to take such institutions into account explicitly.
Other motives for litigation
In some areas of the law a substantial amount of litigation may be due to factors other than uncertainty. We have already mentioned some of these factors in section 2.2, concluding that they do not a¤ect our model because they do not respond to changes in the uncertainty in the law and hence can be treated as constant. Nevertheless, in a comparative perspec-tive, accounting for them may be important. Di¤erent areas of the law may display di¤erent degrees of uncertainty which cannot be fully explained by di¤erences in the rate of litigation or legislation. Litigation driven by other factors than uncertainty may nevertheless result in the production of precedents and statutory interpretation that help resolve the uncertainty in the law and hence may be a substitute for uncertainty-driven litigation. Areas in which such factors are important may be peculiar because they may exhibit low levels of uncertainty even with litigation being inelastic.
Other e¤ects of uncertainty
We have postulated that more uncertainty results in more litigation. However, there are other issues that may play an important role and a¤ect our results, namely with respect to law enforcement, risk-aversion and propensity to resort to private arbitrators. Some studies have emphasized that uncertainty may improve compliance with the law to the point of overcompliance. 50 If uncertainty generates more compliance with the law, it may in turn result in less litigation rather than more as we have postulated. More uncertainty may also result in more frequent arbitration and hence less litigation, as parties meed to …nd alternative solutions to unreliable judicial patterns. More uncertainty could even result in a greater amount of settled cases if parties'risk aversion overcomes the divergence of their opinions over the outcome of the trial. All of these aspects need to be further investigated in order to be able to assess their e¤ect on the relationship between uncertainty in the law and litigation rate and would constitute interesting extensions of our analysis. 
